In the fallout from Labour's disastrous election defeat, various explanations have been advanced - Jeremy Corbyn's unpopularity, unbelievable policy promises - but to me the key factor seems obvious: Brexit. Though sections of the liberal media remain in denial about this (see columns by Will Hutton and William Keegan in last Sunday's Observer), it is obvious that Labour's heaviest losses came in working-class Leave-voting constituencies in the North of England, the Midlands and Wales - by contrast it largely held on to its Remain constituencies, and its only gain was in Putney. We can now see that it was a disastrous mistake for Labour to have promised a second referendum: instead, its policy, the one it should have formulated as soon as the referendum result became known, should have been for a soft Brexit. It should have committed to honouring the referendum result and ending freedom of movement, while remaining in a customs union, committing to an open border on the island of Ireland, retaining membership of EU-linked institutions such as Europol and Erasmus, and maintaining the supply lines that are so vital for the food and manufacturing industries. Of course, such a policy would not have pleased hard-liners on either side of the spectrum: from Brexiteers demanding a "clean break" from the EU, to Remainers determined to overturn the referendum result. It could, however, have appealed both to working-class Leave voters concerned only with whether rather than how Brexit was delivered (those most obsessed with the precise form Brexit should take were the right-wing ideologues who first devised the idea of leaving the EU, who would never vote Labour anyway), and to Remainers who worried about the economic harm Brexit would do but were uneasy about overturning a democratic vote. Labour did, in fact, present a broadly similar policy to this in the 2017 general election, and this was a crucial factor in depriving Theresa May of her majority, by allowing Labour to hold on to the Northern seats May had been targeting - the very seats that have now fallen to Boris Johnson. While Corbyn's dismal poll ratings suggest that the same policy this time around would not have delivered a Labour majority, it is at least arguable that it could have produced another hung parliament, in which Labour may have been able to amend Johnson's deal to include some of the elements listed above.
So why then did Labour abandon a policy that had worked relatively well for it? The shift began in 2018: as the Brexit process became increasingly chaotic, the People's Vote campaign became increasingly vocal in its demand for a second referendum. Its mass rallies in London, not to mention the petition on the Parliament website calling for Article 50 to be revoked, gave the impression of overwhelming mass support for another referendum. Simultaneously, the People's Vote campaign launched a concerted effort to pressurise Labour into changing its stance, notably orchestrating chants of "Where's Jeremy Corbyn?". The Labour leader was placed under further pressure by grassroots organisations in his own party such as Love Socialism Hate Brexit, and Labour for a People's Vote, and by figures within the Shadow Cabinet, including loyal allies of Corbyn such as John McDonnell and Emily Thornberry. These activists were determined to stop Brexit because they saw it as a project devised by right-wing figures with the intention of creating a deregulated tax haven, destroying workers' rights and safety standards, seriously undermining the living standards of the very people that had voted for it, and allowing for a dangerous free trade deal with Donald Trump. Their diagnosis was impeccable - I myself voted Remain for the same reasons - but their prescription was severely flawed. They entirely underestimated the depth of feeling in working-class communities, communities that had for so long felt ignored by the London-based liberal elite, and would inevitably regard attempts to overturn Brexit in that light. This astonishing lack of understanding was encapsulated by Tom Watson's claim that "our values are Remain, our hearts are Remain", forgetting that while this may have been true of a majority of Labour members, it was decidedly not so for a significant proportion of the voters Labour needed to form a government - his old seat, West Bromwich East, was among those that turned blue last Thursday.
Labour's Remain campaigners produced data purporting to show that most Labour voters in Leave seats had backed Remain, implying that Labour could become a Remain party without suffering any electoral consequences. This presupposed that all Remain voters were itching to overturn the referendum result: in fact, significant numbers of them accepted the result and simply wanted Brexit to be over and done with. It seems clear that most of those demanding a second referendum came from affluent constituencies where large majorities had voted Remain, and where most people did not know a single Leave voter: working-class Remain voters in Leave constituencies, who would have counted Brexiteers among their families and friends, were far less likely to want to reopen old wounds. The pressure for Labour to pivot to Remain was exacerbated by Guardian and Observer columnists demanding such a move: it is ironic that those same commentators who had warned against electing Corbyn as leader on the grounds that his policies would be unpopular were now urging Labour to adopt what proved a suicidal strategy. In addition, in early 2019, seven Labour MPs broke away to found Change UK (remember them?): one of the reasons they cited for their actions was Labour's failure to back a second referendum. Faced with such overwhelming pressure, the Labour leader capitulated, and adopted a compromise position: a Labour government would negotiate a new Brexit deal and would hold a referendum between the new deal and remaining in the EU within six months of coming to power.
Armed with this new policy, Labour then allowed the perfect to become the enemy of the not-so-bad by voting down Theresa May's Brexit deal. This was a serious mistake: though May's deal would have led to Britain being forced to comply with EU laws without any say over them, this was part of the trade-offs that Brexit inevitably involves between sovereignty and protecting the economy: trade-offs which the Leave campaign during the referendum had ignored or dismissed. May's proposals were precisely the kind of soft Brexit that Labour should have championed: protecting the economy, maintaining access to the single market for British goods, preserving supply lines, retaining an open border on the island of Ireland, and remaining in the customs union pending a new free trade deal. Defeating May's deal meant that Brexit was delayed beyond the original 29th March deadline, provoking an angry backlash among Leave voters that contributed in no small part to the general election result. If Labour had voted for the deal and it had still been defeated, Labour could have told its constituents that it had voted to deliver Brexit: it was the hard-liners in the Conservative Party who were to blame for the delay. As it was, Labour came across as trying to thwart the will of the people, with the disastrous consequences that we can all see now. And if May's deal had passed, Boris Johnson would not have become Prime Minister.
Labour's Brexit policy left it fatally exposed once Johnson, aided and abetted by the Liberal Democrats, had bounced it into a general election. Johnson's slogan "Get Brexit Done", misleading though it was, resonated with working-class Leave voters angry that Brexit had not been delivered on time, and weary of the seemingly never-ending process. In addition, he was able to persuade Labour's traditional supporters that the Party's policy would simply produce more "dither and delay", and that Labour was actively trying to block Brexit. In the face of this, Labour was left helpless to defend itself against the blue tsunami that washed over and broke down the red wall.
So what next for Labour? First and foremost, the Party should make clear its acceptance of Brexit by at least abstaining on Johnson's deal, and by leaving campaigning to rejoin the EU to the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. As for Labour's longer-term direction, my personal view, as a non-Labour Party member, is that Angela Rayner would be the best candidate for the leadership. Her working-class background is exactly what Labour needs to have any chance of winning back Northern voters, and her having been a single mother would be a powerful reminder of the ugly attitudes that Johnson harbours towards the very class he claims to champion. As someone who served loyally in Corbyn's Shadow Cabinet, but is not herself a Corbynite, she would be acceptable to all wings of the Party. She has also hinted that she would support a Brexit deal, is an effective media performer and some Conservatives are said to fear her as a potential opponent - all the more reason for choosing her. If Rayner, as she has hinted, chooses instead to focus on the deputy leadership, then Lisa Nandy would be the best choice: as the MP for a working-class Leave voting constituency, and one who has worked closely with her constituents, she would also have an appeal to the very voters that Labour desperately needs to win back. For the other candidates, Rebecca Long-Bailey could easily be portrayed as the "continuity Corbyn" candidate by the Conservatives and their media allies, Jess Phillips may well prove popular with the public but her outspoken attacks on Corbyn would make her unpopular with large swathes of the Party membership, while Keir Starmer and Emily Thornberry can easily be caricatured, like Corbyn, as north London liberals - even more importantly, both were instrumental in Labour's disastrous shift to backing a second referendum. Indeed, the allegations that Thornberry described Leave voters as "stupid", whether true or not, should lead to the next leader dropping her from the Shadow Cabinet: Labour simply cannot afford to have a member of its frontbench team who is perceived as condescending towards the working class. But whoever is eventually chosen, Labour needs a leader who will retain Corbyn's most popular policies - but not to over-promise - while avoiding the baggage he carried over anti-Semitism, patriotism and national security (whether these perceptions were justified or not is beside the point, the fact remains that they were there and contributed to Labour's defeat).
Whoever is the next Labour leader faces a daunting task. Johnson's promise to improve infrastructure in the North and Midlands, and his pledge to fund the NHS, raises the very real possibility that working-class voters in England and Wales, just like the Scottish voters who deserted Labour en masse for the SNP in 2015, will never come back - and if they don't, Labour can never form a government ever again. The new leader will also face media hostility, like nearly all previous Labour leaders. Governing parties with a majority of the size the Conservatives now enjoy nearly always go on to win another term. Johnson's voter suppression law will only make Labour's mountain even steeper. Despite this, Johnson's coalition of economically left-wing voters in the North and Midlands, and Thatcherite voters in the Tory shires, will surely fall apart one day - even though it may take 10 to 15 years before that happens. Whether Johnson will keep his promises is always an open question. And, of course, there is the possibility of a Brexit-caused recession that may blow his government off course - having said that, Donald Trump's voters have been hard hit by his trade wars, but remain utterly loyal to him.
And finally, what are we to make of the Corbyn movement? With a few honourable exceptions, most commentators have made no effort to understand those (including my sister) who flocked to the Party in order to vote for Corbyn in 2015, or the crowds who chanted his name at Glastonbury two years later, instead caricaturing the movement either as a crazed cult (Andrew Rawnsley) or an evil, anti-Semitic, anti-democratic plot (Nick Cohen). In reality, Corbyn attracted scores of idealistic young people passionately committed to equality and social justice, values that had been severely eroded in the Cameron years, and who saw his candidacy as a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve the radical change that the country sorely needs. I myself have attended Corbynite gatherings and have witnessed at first hand the enthusiasm, ideas and commitment of activists who are sincerely dedicated to changing the world for the better. If they ultimately put their trust in an unelectable leader, the reason for this is that the other three leadership contenders in 2015 were committed to accepting David Cameron's austerity policies. Andy Burnham might have been able to corral the enthusiasm of the new members - and to have led Labour to an election victory with the policies they supported - but fatally compromised himself when he chose not to resign from the Shadow Cabinet after Harriet Harman whipped Labour to abstain on Cameron's welfare cuts. In the long run, Corbyn's policies of reversing the worst of the austerity measures, properly funding the NHS and better public transport, if coupled with a more appealing leader and if properly costed and without the wilder spending commitments made in this year's campaign, could be the key to reconnecting Labour with its traditional working-class supporters.
Labour's Remain campaigners produced data purporting to show that most Labour voters in Leave seats had backed Remain, implying that Labour could become a Remain party without suffering any electoral consequences. This presupposed that all Remain voters were itching to overturn the referendum result: in fact, significant numbers of them accepted the result and simply wanted Brexit to be over and done with. It seems clear that most of those demanding a second referendum came from affluent constituencies where large majorities had voted Remain, and where most people did not know a single Leave voter: working-class Remain voters in Leave constituencies, who would have counted Brexiteers among their families and friends, were far less likely to want to reopen old wounds. The pressure for Labour to pivot to Remain was exacerbated by Guardian and Observer columnists demanding such a move: it is ironic that those same commentators who had warned against electing Corbyn as leader on the grounds that his policies would be unpopular were now urging Labour to adopt what proved a suicidal strategy. In addition, in early 2019, seven Labour MPs broke away to found Change UK (remember them?): one of the reasons they cited for their actions was Labour's failure to back a second referendum. Faced with such overwhelming pressure, the Labour leader capitulated, and adopted a compromise position: a Labour government would negotiate a new Brexit deal and would hold a referendum between the new deal and remaining in the EU within six months of coming to power.
Armed with this new policy, Labour then allowed the perfect to become the enemy of the not-so-bad by voting down Theresa May's Brexit deal. This was a serious mistake: though May's deal would have led to Britain being forced to comply with EU laws without any say over them, this was part of the trade-offs that Brexit inevitably involves between sovereignty and protecting the economy: trade-offs which the Leave campaign during the referendum had ignored or dismissed. May's proposals were precisely the kind of soft Brexit that Labour should have championed: protecting the economy, maintaining access to the single market for British goods, preserving supply lines, retaining an open border on the island of Ireland, and remaining in the customs union pending a new free trade deal. Defeating May's deal meant that Brexit was delayed beyond the original 29th March deadline, provoking an angry backlash among Leave voters that contributed in no small part to the general election result. If Labour had voted for the deal and it had still been defeated, Labour could have told its constituents that it had voted to deliver Brexit: it was the hard-liners in the Conservative Party who were to blame for the delay. As it was, Labour came across as trying to thwart the will of the people, with the disastrous consequences that we can all see now. And if May's deal had passed, Boris Johnson would not have become Prime Minister.
Labour's Brexit policy left it fatally exposed once Johnson, aided and abetted by the Liberal Democrats, had bounced it into a general election. Johnson's slogan "Get Brexit Done", misleading though it was, resonated with working-class Leave voters angry that Brexit had not been delivered on time, and weary of the seemingly never-ending process. In addition, he was able to persuade Labour's traditional supporters that the Party's policy would simply produce more "dither and delay", and that Labour was actively trying to block Brexit. In the face of this, Labour was left helpless to defend itself against the blue tsunami that washed over and broke down the red wall.
So what next for Labour? First and foremost, the Party should make clear its acceptance of Brexit by at least abstaining on Johnson's deal, and by leaving campaigning to rejoin the EU to the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. As for Labour's longer-term direction, my personal view, as a non-Labour Party member, is that Angela Rayner would be the best candidate for the leadership. Her working-class background is exactly what Labour needs to have any chance of winning back Northern voters, and her having been a single mother would be a powerful reminder of the ugly attitudes that Johnson harbours towards the very class he claims to champion. As someone who served loyally in Corbyn's Shadow Cabinet, but is not herself a Corbynite, she would be acceptable to all wings of the Party. She has also hinted that she would support a Brexit deal, is an effective media performer and some Conservatives are said to fear her as a potential opponent - all the more reason for choosing her. If Rayner, as she has hinted, chooses instead to focus on the deputy leadership, then Lisa Nandy would be the best choice: as the MP for a working-class Leave voting constituency, and one who has worked closely with her constituents, she would also have an appeal to the very voters that Labour desperately needs to win back. For the other candidates, Rebecca Long-Bailey could easily be portrayed as the "continuity Corbyn" candidate by the Conservatives and their media allies, Jess Phillips may well prove popular with the public but her outspoken attacks on Corbyn would make her unpopular with large swathes of the Party membership, while Keir Starmer and Emily Thornberry can easily be caricatured, like Corbyn, as north London liberals - even more importantly, both were instrumental in Labour's disastrous shift to backing a second referendum. Indeed, the allegations that Thornberry described Leave voters as "stupid", whether true or not, should lead to the next leader dropping her from the Shadow Cabinet: Labour simply cannot afford to have a member of its frontbench team who is perceived as condescending towards the working class. But whoever is eventually chosen, Labour needs a leader who will retain Corbyn's most popular policies - but not to over-promise - while avoiding the baggage he carried over anti-Semitism, patriotism and national security (whether these perceptions were justified or not is beside the point, the fact remains that they were there and contributed to Labour's defeat).
Whoever is the next Labour leader faces a daunting task. Johnson's promise to improve infrastructure in the North and Midlands, and his pledge to fund the NHS, raises the very real possibility that working-class voters in England and Wales, just like the Scottish voters who deserted Labour en masse for the SNP in 2015, will never come back - and if they don't, Labour can never form a government ever again. The new leader will also face media hostility, like nearly all previous Labour leaders. Governing parties with a majority of the size the Conservatives now enjoy nearly always go on to win another term. Johnson's voter suppression law will only make Labour's mountain even steeper. Despite this, Johnson's coalition of economically left-wing voters in the North and Midlands, and Thatcherite voters in the Tory shires, will surely fall apart one day - even though it may take 10 to 15 years before that happens. Whether Johnson will keep his promises is always an open question. And, of course, there is the possibility of a Brexit-caused recession that may blow his government off course - having said that, Donald Trump's voters have been hard hit by his trade wars, but remain utterly loyal to him.
And finally, what are we to make of the Corbyn movement? With a few honourable exceptions, most commentators have made no effort to understand those (including my sister) who flocked to the Party in order to vote for Corbyn in 2015, or the crowds who chanted his name at Glastonbury two years later, instead caricaturing the movement either as a crazed cult (Andrew Rawnsley) or an evil, anti-Semitic, anti-democratic plot (Nick Cohen). In reality, Corbyn attracted scores of idealistic young people passionately committed to equality and social justice, values that had been severely eroded in the Cameron years, and who saw his candidacy as a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve the radical change that the country sorely needs. I myself have attended Corbynite gatherings and have witnessed at first hand the enthusiasm, ideas and commitment of activists who are sincerely dedicated to changing the world for the better. If they ultimately put their trust in an unelectable leader, the reason for this is that the other three leadership contenders in 2015 were committed to accepting David Cameron's austerity policies. Andy Burnham might have been able to corral the enthusiasm of the new members - and to have led Labour to an election victory with the policies they supported - but fatally compromised himself when he chose not to resign from the Shadow Cabinet after Harriet Harman whipped Labour to abstain on Cameron's welfare cuts. In the long run, Corbyn's policies of reversing the worst of the austerity measures, properly funding the NHS and better public transport, if coupled with a more appealing leader and if properly costed and without the wilder spending commitments made in this year's campaign, could be the key to reconnecting Labour with its traditional working-class supporters.
